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Bomber Command Commander in Chief, Arthur Harris, had proved very cautious with his squadrons following his appointment in February 1942. The introduction of the Gee navigation aid was a major step forward and the recent operations against Lubeck and Rostock had been very successful. Bomber Command was slowly building up strength with the new generation of four engined heavy bombers coming into service but there was still a question mark over the future of the Command in some quarters. Harris firmly believed in the role of Bomber Command as a potential war-winning weapon and was determined to silence the critics. To this effect he and his staff devised a plan for a thousand-bomber raid on a major German city. At that time Bomber Command had about 400 front line aircraft available. To make up the numbers Harris drew on all his reserves. Aircraft and crews from No 91 and No 92 Operational Training Units were included together with substantial contributions from Coastal Command and Flying Training Command. New tactics were developed for the operation in which the force would fly a common route and at the same speed to the target and back. Each aircraft would fly at an allotted height and in a certain time slot to minimise the risk of collision. This was referred to as the " bomber stream ". The Gee navigational aid made it easier for the bombers to fly within these limits. By flying the same route within a tight time frame the bombers would be able to swamp the German night fighter command and control system which was organised into boxes and which could only handle six interceptions per hour per box. It was also planned for the whole bombing force to pass over the target within a 90-minute period. The intention of this was to overwhelm the flak defences although it was anticipated that there would be a high risk of collisions over the target. The raid was to be led by experienced crews from No 1 Group and No 3 Group whose aircraft were all equipped with Gee. They would carry all incendiary bomb loads and were allowed a 15 minutes period over the target to identify and mark it with incendiaries before the main force arrived. The plans received a serious setback when the Admiralty withdrew permission for the use of the Coastal Command aircraft. They were concerned that the operation would jeopardise the build up of their long range anti submarine aircraft force. This was probably correct. It was also found that only four of the aircraft from Flying Training Command were suitable for such an operation. Harris was determined that the original planned figure of a thousand aircraft should be assembled. Bomber Commands own training units provided most of the balance committing more crews from the bottom half of their courses. This was a big risk and every effort was made to provide each crew with at least an experienced pilot. 49 of the crews, however, flew with pupil pilots. In addition to the Cologne operation, aircraft from No 2 Group, Fighter Command and the Army Co-operation Command were to fly intruder operations against German night fighter airfields on the route of the bomber stream. The plan was ready and the aircraft and crews available as the end of May approached. The first choice target was Hamburg, which was a prime target because of its large port and ship and U boat building facilities. The weather forecast for the period of the full moon was not good in Northern Germany therefore it was decided to attack the second choice target which was Cologne. On the night of the 30/31st May 1942 the operation went ahead. The main force consisted of: - No 1 Group - 156 aircraft. No 3 Group - 222 aircraft. No 4 Group - 147 aircraft. No 5 Group - 153 aircraft. 91 (OTU) - 257 aircraft. 92 (OTU) - 108 aircraft. Flying Training Command - four aircraft. Total - 1,047 aircraft and crews. At Elsham Wolds 19 Wellingtons and crews of 103 Squadron were detailed to take part and were briefed to bomb Point of Aim A. Bundles of leaflets were carried by each aircraft to be dropped at Rotterdam and Munchen Gladbach on the way to the target. The importance of this maximum effort is illustrated by the fact that the Base Commander, G/C H A Constantine, and the Squadron Commander, W/C J F H De Boulay, took part in the operation, captaining their own crews. W/C De Boulay was the first to take off at 22:41 and the last aircraft, captained by Sgt Gill, took off at 23:24. The Squadron encountered some cloud on the route but this dispersed 60 miles from Cologne and the target area was clear. They had little difficulty spotting the target, which could easily be identified by a prominent bend in the River Rhine and other ground details. All the aircraft bombed within the 14,000ft/12,000ft height band but it was impossible for the crews to assess their own results because of the many fires and amount of smoke in the target area. Of the other aircraft in the main force a few arrived early mingling with the target marking force but causing no disruption. The marking proved accurate and the bombers were able to inflict heavy damage to the city. The flak and searchlights soon began to show signs of the pressure as the bombers arrived in such large numbers but still managed to take their toll. It was reported that 22 bombers had been lost in the region of the target. 16 of these were credited to flak and four to night fighters. Two bombers were lost in a collision. The German night fighters are also thought to have shot down 19 of the bombers on the way to or returning from Cologne. The 56 intruder sorties undertaken on that night met with little or no success and two Blenheims were lost. Of the 103 Squadron aircraft the Wellington of F/S W Onions and crew was shot down and all are buried at the Reichwald Forest War Cemetery. A Bf 110 night fighter subjected the Wellington of F/L C K Saxelby and crew to an attack after crossing the Dutch coast on the return trip. The second pilot, Sgt G C Roberts, was stationed in the astrodome acting as an extra lookout and was killed in the attack. In addition the rear gunner, F/S L P St Pierre, was wounded. The aircraft fuselage caught fire and half the tail plane was stripped and the trimmers shot away. The navigator, F/O T C Pipkin and the wireless operator, F/S W J Mclean managed to put out the fire and F/O Pipkin sustained quite serious burns to his hands. The aircraft hydraulics had been hit and the undercarriage and bomb doors started to droop but F/L Saxelby was able to make an emergency landing at Honington. F/L Saxelby and F/O Pipkin each were awarded the DFC for their actions on that night and F/S McLean received a DFM. The aircraft of W/C De Boulay was first to return to Elsham Wolds at 03:55. 15 others followed with the last arriving home at 05:08. Sgt L M Flowers and crew landed at Kirmington. The next day they took off for Elsham Wolds. Shortly after take off the reduction gear in the port outer engine failed and the airscrew came away. The aircraft stalled and crashed near the airfield killing three and injuring two of the crew. In total 1,103 sorties were flown that night and 43 aircraft lost. This was thought to be an acceptable loss in view of the perfect weather conditions and was well within the casualty figure of 100 that Winston Churchill was prepared for. F/O Manser,a pilot of 50 Squadron, was killed on this night and was awarded the Victoria Cross for sacrificing his own life to enable his crew to bale out of his seriously damaged Avro Manchester bomber. Contrary to expectations the crews from the training units fared surprisingly well on this raid and had a lower proportion of casualties than the regular crews. For Cologne, the raid had proved a harrowing experience with over 450 dead and 5000 injured. 2,500 separate fires were started with 12,840 properties destroyed or damaged including 2,560 of an industrial or commercial nature. The infrastructure of the Cologne was seriously disrupted and, in the days that followed, between 135,000 and 150,000 people left the city. The tactics used during this operation had proved very successful and the "bomber stream" was used to great effect throughout the rest of the war. In Britain the raid proved an immense propaganda success making headline news and proving a great morale booster for the British and Commonwealth peoples and also those in Occupied Europe. It clearly showed that RAF was capable of taking the war right into the heart of Germany and that Bomber Command was now becoming a force to be reckoned with. | |
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