| |
| |
Bomber Command operations over the previous weeks had been handicapped by consistent bad weather and there was mounting criticism at home regarding the poor bombing results achieved so far. Air Marshall Sir Richard Peirce, the then C in C of Bomber Command, was coming under increasing pressure to produce better results and he and his staff elected to mount a major attack on Germany in an effort to silence their critics. The main plan involved an attack on Berlin by bombers from 1, 3 and 4 and 5 Groups. In addition bombers from 1 and 3 Groups were to attack Mannheim. The night chosen for this raid was the 7/8th November 1941. A total force of around 400 aircraft were detailed for the night's operations. As preparations for the attacks proceeded it was clear that the weather forecast for the night in question would be most unfavourable. Convection cloud was predicted to build up to between 15,000ft and 20,000ft over much of Western Europe with hail, icing and storms over the North Sea. It was also thought there would be a strong Westerly wind which would severely hamper the returning bombers particularly those on the Berlin raid which had the furthest to fly. In spite of this preparations continued and on the afternoon of the 7th November the latest weather forecast confirmed the predictions. The operation was not cancelled however and the commanding officer of 5 Group, Air Vice-Marshall John Slessor, objected strongly to the plan. For his squadrons of Handley Page Hampdens a Berlin raid was always at the limit of their endurance at the best of times and in bad weather it would be suicidal. After some discussion, it was agreed that 5 Group would be removed from the Berlin raid but would attack Cologne instead. 103 Squadron at Elsham Wolds had been briefed to attack Mannheim with the main railway station as the aiming point. Six crews were detailed for the operation. At all the airfields the crews taking part were warned of the probable difficult weather conditions and were told, if they were low on fuel on the return flight, they should make for the nearer airfields in the South of England rather than to attempt to reach their home base. Early in the evening of the 7th November the bombers started to take off for their targets. The final total of bombers sent was 392, which was a record total for Bomber Command in one night of the war so far. 169 bombers were sent to Berlin, 75 to Cologne and 55 to Mannheim. In addition 30 bombers were sent on "rover patrols" to Essen and surrounding areas, 28 to Ostend, 22 to Boulogne and 13 more were tasked to lay mines in Oslo Fjord. The first crews found the cloud extending higher than the forecast limits and were forced to use up more of their fuel as they strained to get their fully ladern bombers to the required altitude. Only 73 bombers managed to struggle through the cloud and icing to reach and bomb the German capital with the others forced to turn North because of dwindling fuel reserves to attack targets on the German coast. Berlin records show scattered bombing on the outskirts of the city. The Cologne attack was similarly disappointing. At Mannheim the result was again a great disappointment. 103 Squadron had found the target area covered in 5/10ths cloud and there was thick ground haze, which was quite common in the industrial areas of Germany. P/O Jones, Sgt Giles, P/O Allen and Sgt Lewis all bombed from between 14,000ft and 18,000ft at around 2100. P/O Wallis and his crew could not identify the target and but did see the flarepath of an airfield and chose to bomb that instead. The flarepath was doused just before they bombed but flashes were seen and two fires were started. The Squadron records note that there was negligible opposition over the coast and little in the target area. Moderate heavy flak was encountered and considerable light flak but both were inaccurate. Only one searchlight cone was sighted. The returning crews were subjected to a dreadful flight home with some flying below 1,000ft in an attempt to get under the weather. Others attempted to fly over or round the weather but at considerable cost to their fuel supply. SOS calls soon started to be picked up as some returning crews were forced to ditch in the North Sea but there was little possibility of survival in the freezing conditions. Two crews from 103 Squadron managed to return to base and three more landed at other airfields. The F/L Lawson and crew failed to return. They were last reported on the radio in the early hours of the morning and were given a bearing but nothing further was heard from them. Their Wellington crashed near Nancy in France. F/L Lawson and five of his crew were taken prisoner. The co-pilot, Sgt C W Onions, was killed. The navigator, Sgt A W Mills, escaped and returned to the UK in October 1942. Sgt Mills later recalled that high winds, 10/10ths cloud and reciprocal radio bearings received from base saw them end up over Vichy France where they presumably ran out of fuel. He was captured and interned at Fort de la Revere but escaped the following year and eventually made his way to Gibralter. In all 37 aircraft were lost on this night, which was 9.4% of the force. The opposition however was reported as slight. Three of the minelaying aircraft had been lost to flak and only three bombers were seen to be shot down in flames over Germany. Of the returning bombers only 13 had any flak damage. It is thought at the time that most of the aircraft losses were due to the weather and aircraft ditching in the North Sea out of fuel on the return flight. Post war research shows that 11 bombers, including three from the mining force sent to Oslo, probably came down in the sea. The remainder was lost over Germany, France, Belgium or The Netherlands with the German defences more successful than thought. The casualties that night had been the heaviest suffered by Bomber Command in the war so far. There was considerable concern about the losses and Churchill ordered an immediate curtailment of attacks on Berlin until the weather improved. Bomber Command did not mount any further raids on the German capital until 1943. Air Marshall Pierce defended his decision to go ahead with the raid saying that he had not been fully informed as to the extent of the bad weather which had been forecast. He also pointed out that his crews were insufficiently trained in long range flying to handle difficult conditions. This was clearly obvious and should have been already been addressed. The Air Staff were not fully satisfied with his report and the secretary of State for Air, Sir Archbald Sinclair, insisted that the Winston Churchill be informed of the situation. On the 8th January 1942, Air Marshall Pierce was posted to command the Allied Air Forces in South East Asia. He had been in charge of Bomber Command over a very difficult 14 month period when his force was not equipped with suitable aircraft and had only the most basic of navigation aids and no radar. In spite of the considerable efforts and bravery of his crews the results were not considered to be worth the heavy price paid and fresh minds with new ideas were required. Air Marshall Pierce was replaced as C in C Bomber Command by Air Vice-Marshall Baldwin on a temporary basis until a permanent replacement was chosen. In February 1942 Arthur Travers Harris was appointed the Commander in Chief of Bomber Command. | |
| |
Flight Lieutenant E V Lawson RAF, pictured in the cockpit of his aircraft . | ||
| | |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
